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The Reintegration of Ex-Combatants and Post-Conflict Violence. An Analysis of 
Municipal Crime Levels in Colombia 
Andrea González Peña and Han Dorussen 
 
Abstract 
Violent crime in Colombia is analyzed following the demobilization of ex-combatants 
using municipal-level data. The main findings are that an increased presence of ex-
combatants does not systematically increase homicides, but may increase robberies. 
Reintegration programs are shown to matter. Former paramilitaries who are not in a 
reintegration program increase crime. Former guerillas increase robberies, regardless of 
whether they are in or out of reintegration, but homicides decrease for guerrillas in 
reintegration. Ex-combatants often settle in municipalities with more crime. Controlling 
for reverse causality, ex-combatants only increase crime if they are not in reintegration, 
while in reintegration they may reduce crime.  
 
Keywords: Demobilization, Reintegration, Post-Conflict Violence, Colombia, Crime 
Rates, 2SLS  
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Introduction 
The end of civil war does not necessarily lead to a reduction of violence. When fighting 
stops and even with peace-building strategies in place, kidnapping, homicides, robberies 
and domestic violence often persist. In fact, for a number of countries, such as El 
Salvador, Guatemala, South Africa and Afghanistan, among others, studies report an 
increase of crime after the end of civil war.1 Types of violence normally associated with 
post-conflict situations are riots, violent crime, domestic violence, sexual abuse, gang 
violence and revenge killings (Aguirre 2012; Barron 2014). Importantly, the violence is 
generally not politically motivated (Geneva Declaration Secretariat 2008). Our first 
research question is whether the demobilization of former combatants can explain the 
increase in violent crime. In their seminal study on post-conflict crime, Archer and 
Gartner (1976) characterize this as the ‘violent veterans model’. However, 
demobilization does not take place in a political vacuum. Demobilization, disarmament 
and reintegration (DDR) processes are increasingly used as tools of peace consolidation, 
which enable the state to regain its monopoly on the use of force while providing 
security guarantees to ex-combatants. From a development point of view, DDR 
programs also aim to improve the socio-economic position of ex-combatants and their 
communities (Correia 2009; Giustozzi 2012). Better economic opportunities for ex-
combatants as well as reintegration into their communities, rather than continued 
reliance on social networks established during conflict, should reduce crime. Therefore, 
our second question is whether programs that support the reintegration of ex-combatants 
reduce post-conflict crime. 
 
To address these questions, we examine Colombia, which has witnessed various periods 
of internal armed conflict since 1948. The focus is on the dynamics of violent crime 
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after 2003 following the peace negotiations with the United Self Defense Forces 
(Autodefensas Unidad de Colombia, or AUC) as well as the implementation of 
demobilization programs targeting individual rebel combatants or guerillas (primarily 
from the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, or FARC, and the Ejército de 
Liberación Nacional, or ELN).2 The paramilitaries and guerillas had different wartime 
experiences affecting the connections to their communities and also participated in 
distinct DDR processes. The individual and collective programs were run by the 
Ministry of Defence, Oficina del Ato Comisionado para la Paz (OACP), and the 
Colombian Agency for Reintegration (ACR) in collaboration with other governmental 
institutions. 
 
Our analysis distinguishes accordingly between the presence of former rebels and 
paramilitary forces, and also between ex-combatants who are still in reintegration and 
those who dropped out. It covers the period 2003 – 2013 before the signing of the peace 
agreement between the government and FARC in November 2016 and the agreed DDR 
program for FARC fighters starting in March 2017. The possible end of the long-
running conflict makes it even more pertinent to understand how the presence of ex-
combatants affects crime and how reintegration can alleviate such concerns.   
 
The social disruption of community, economic collapse and reduced institutions are 
troublesome legacies of conflict. Family and community ties get broken because of 
wartime killings as well as increased (female) mortality as a consequence of 
deteriorating healthcare. Young people find themselves with limited educational 
opportunities (Lai and Thyne 2006) and may have been recruited to fight instead. Wars 
force people to flee, and their return after the end of conflict can usher in disputes over 
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land and housing. The wartime destruction of infrastructure and production facilities 
can lead to an economic collapse with limited availability of consumption goods and 
(legal) employment opportunities. Instead, black markets and illegal economic activities 
flourish. Civil wars also tend to undermine state capacity. In the immediate post-conflict 
period, there is often a limited police presence with poorly functioning (local) public 
authorities and court systems.  
 
The legacy of conflict is commonly seen as a major cause for post-war crime waves. 
For example, Nussio and Howe (2014) explain the increase of post-conflict violence in 
the Colombian department of Córdoba as resulting from the breakdown of the illegal 
protection system established by paramilitary groups. Studying Northern Ireland, 
Deglow attributes increases in crime after the conflict to its legacy: “The results indicate 
the more an area has been exposed to violence, and the larger the proportion of this 
violence committed by anti-government groups, the more violent crime on the local 
level” (Deglow 2016, 786). Barron (2014) explains post-conflict violence in Indonesia 
as a legacy of conflict, with a political economy of violence, elite struggles for power 
and limited state capacity to maintain order. After the signing of a peace agreement in 
1987, Nicaragua witnessed a dramatic increase in urban crime attributed to high 
unemployment rates, in particular among urban youths, low levels of social capital and 
existing drug trafficking routes (Brune and Bossert 2009; Chamorro 2015; Marti Puig 
2002, Rodgers 2002; 2013; Rodgers and Jensen 2015). 
 
Ex-combatants are often seen as pivotal in the upsurge in post-conflict crime. Former 
combatants commonly struggle to reintegrate in society and to make use of legal 
opportunities to earn money (Howe 2012). Moreover, the skills they gained in fighting 
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and the close social bonds between ex-combatants tempt them to criminal activities. Ex-
combatants are not only more at risk of committing crime themselves, their activities 
also have a spillover effect on the wider community. At the same time, demobilization 
and reintegration programs target ex-combatants specifically. To the extent that these 
programs are effective, they should reduce the risks of ex-combatants committing crime 
and may even have positive spillover effects to the wider community. In Colombia, 
Kaplan and Nussio (2018b) find lower rates of recidivism and more socially vibrant 
communities where ex-combatants are better able to integrate. Recognizing the broader 
impact of demobilization and reintegration, our study examines the impact of the 
presence of former combatants and their participation in reintegration programs on 
municipal crime levels.  
 
To properly evaluate any link between ex-combatants and crime, it is important to deal 
with possible reverse causality, particularly when analyzing municipal level data. It is 
plausible that former combatants base their decision on where to settle in part on their 
perception of crime levels and they avoid areas with high crime rates because of safety 
concerns. Yet it is also possible that they have little choice but to settle in municipalities 
with high crime rates. Regardless, failing to control for endogeneity would bias our 
estimates. If ex-combatants avoid high-crime areas, we are likely to underestimate their 
effect on crime. If they settle mainly in high-crime areas, we would overestimate their 
impact. We address possible reverse causality via an instrumental-variable approach 
(Baltagi 2005; Cameron and Trivedi 2010) using place of birth as an instrument. The 
assumption is that changes in crime rate do not affect where former combatants were 




The main empirical findings are that the increased presence of ex-combatants 
sometimes has a statistically significant and positive effect on robberies, but it does not 
appear to increase the rate of homicides. These results are sensitive to contrasting 
former paramilitaries and guerrillas, as well as the number of ex-combatants involved in 
reintegration. The presence of former paramilitaries who are not in reintegration 
increases homicide and robbery rates. Former guerillas, regardless of whether they are 
in or out of a reintegration program, are associated with increased robberies. A higher 
number of guerrillas in reintegration correlate with fewer homicides. The findings of the 
instrumental-variable models, moreover, indicate that ex-combatants are more likely to 
have settled in municipalities with high crime rates. Controlling for reverse causality, 
the robust finding is that only former combatants who are not in reintegration increase 
crime rates, while ex-combatants in reintegration tend to decrease crime rates. Rather 
than a general ‘violent veterans’ model, these findings support a more careful 
understanding of the legacy of conflict. Any link between ex-combatants and crime 
appears conditional on limited socio-economic opportunities and a continued reliance of 
wartime social ties instead of reintegrating into civilian society.  
 
The next section develops our theoretical argument regarding the link between ex-
combatants and post-conflict crime and discusses the relevance of DDR programs. 
Before presenting the results of the statistical analysis, the research design and data are 
introduced. The main results are followed by an overview of robustness checks (with 
details in the on-line Appendix). We conclude with a discussion of the main findings 
and policy implications.   
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The Problem of Post-Conflict Crime 
Archer and Gartner observe that “[m]ost of the combatant nations in the study 
experienced substantial postwar increases in their rates of homicide. These increases did 
not occur among a control group of noncombatant nations” (1976, 961). Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004) show that homicide rates increased after the end of African civil wars, 
while Rivera (2016) reports increased homicide rates after conflict in Latin America. In 
the ‘violent veterans model’, the experiences of ex-combatants are considered pivotal to 
the dynamics of post-conflict crime. Accordingly, we consider the legacy of conflict as 
well as the conditions of peace for ex-combatants.  
 
LEGACY OF CONFLICT Ex-combatants provide a direct link between the conflict and 
post-conflict situations. They are often particularly vulnerable to the insecurities of the 
post-war environment and considered more likely to resort to crime because of their 
wartime experiences. Commenting on veterans returning from the Vietnam War, Lifton 
(1970) writes: “Some are likely to seek continuing outlets to a pattern of violence to 
which they have become habituated, whether by indulging in antisocial or criminal 
behavior or by offering their services to the highest bidder” (Lifton 1970, quoted in 
Archer and Gartner 1976, 943). Nearly all combatants lived through violent episodes 
and their personal history continues to shape attitudes and behavior. Moreover, former 
combatants commonly have to deal with a lack of opportunities for legal work, which 
increases their insecurity (Özerdem 2012).  
 
Built on the experience of having to rely on and trust fellow combatants during the war, 
the bonds between ex-combatants are often very close and strong. The wartime 
networks help veterans through periods of personal, economic and social upheaval after 
	 9	
demobilization. At the same time, these networks can be conducive to criminal 
activities. Rodgers argues that the first wave of gang violence in Nicaragua was linked 
to the demobilization of the Sandinista popular army and that for many ex-combatants 
joining a gang was “a natural continuation of their previous role as a soldier” (Rodgers 
2013, 21). Nussio finds that especially mid- and high-ranking former combatants have 
accumulated ‘criminal capital’: “They are the nodes in the criminal networks who hold 
the organisational memory about the extraction of criminal rents from existing war 
economies, ie knowledge about the smuggling routes, contacts to suppliers and 
customers, and strategies to cope with competitors and authorities” (Nussio 2018, 143). 
Daly et al. (2017) also highlight the enduring social ties between ex-combatants and 
especially former commanders. They emphasize that the social ties between former 
combatants not only increase the capabilities to engage in crime but also their 
motivation.  
 
The wartime experience may also lead to the social legitimation of violence (Parsons 
1917) in the sense that during wartime killings are portrayed as normal or possibly even 
heroic. Killings in the post-war period are seen as a lasting effect of the social 
legitimation of violence. Analyzing post-apartheid violence in South Africa, Schuld 
(2013) considers the culture of violence inherited from the apartheid system as a 
primary cause of persisting xenophobia, political assassinations, mob violence and 
violent protests. Importantly, as Archer and Gartner (1976, 944) observe: “since 
civilians and soldiers alike could be influenced by this legitimation process, this model 
predicts that homicide increases will occur among both veterans and nonveterans”. 
However, it is reasonable to expect that ex-combatants are most prone to internalize the 
legitimation of violence, and that communities with most extensive and close ties to ex-
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combatants will be exposed most to the change in norms.  
 
Previous studies such as Kaplan and Nussio (2018a; 2018b) and Daly et al. (2017) study 
the susceptibility of ex-combatants to crime in Colombia at the individual level, 
whereas our research focuses on the municipal level.4 Howe (2012) also studies the 
crime at the municipal level and finds a positive correlation between ex-combatants and 
crime. We consider individual- and municipal-level approaches to be complementary, 
each with specific strengths and weaknesses. At the individual level we can measure 
directly any link between being an ex-combatant, participation in DDR programs and 
crime. However, measurement error and high variation of idiosyncratic circumstances 
make it difficult to establish such a link statistically since random error easily 
overwhelms any substantive effect. Moreover, even if former combatants are not 
involved in crime themselves, their presence could have an impact on the communities 
where they reside. If the presence of former combatants legitimizes violence, it will 
increase instability, tensions and crime rates within the wider community. If the social 
networks of former combatants are transformed as criminal organizations, they will also 
attract and recruit persons who did not participate in the war originally.  
 
These arguments suggest that the presences of former combatants should increase crime 
levels, since they have fewer opportunities for legal work, they are trained to use force, 
and they have internalized more violent norms. The tight bonds between former 
combatants provide a network that may be used to facilitate criminal activities. 
Moreover, any effects are likely to spillover to the wider community. Consequently, 




Hypothesis 1: Post-conflict violent crime rates will increase more in municipalities with 
a larger number of former combatants. 
 
We recognize that there is notable variation in the experience and socio-economic 
background of former combatants. The analysis therefore distinguishes between former 
guerrillas and paramilitaries, and between robberies and homicides as distinct crime 
categories. In Colombia, former guerrillas left their often rural communities to fight and 
hide in remote forests. In contrast, paramilitary fighters generally operated in the urban 
areas where they resided and thus remained more closely connected to their 
communities. Former guerrillas generally held a weaker socio-economic position, 
making them more susceptible to property crimes, such as robberies. 
 
During the period covered in our research, guerillas and paramilitaries were 
demobilized by means of different processes. Fighters from FARC and ELN 
demobilized on an individual basis and basically deserted their rebel armies. The 
paramilitaries demobilized collectively as part of an agreement between the government 
and the AUC. The social ties between former paramilitaries are thus likely to be 
stronger than among former guerillas, making the former more likely to engage in more 
organized and violent crime, such as homicides.  
 
CONDITIONS OF PEACE There is increased awareness that the insecurity of former 
combatants needs to be addressed in peace negotiations and peace-building programs to 
avoid political instability. The objective of demobilization, disarmament and 
reintegration (DDR) programs is not only to strengthen peace agreements but also to 
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address the specific concerns of former combatants. Studying DDR programs in 
Southern Africa, Dzinesa observes that these goals are often closely intertwined: 
 
DDR processes stood a better chance where the principle of a 
comprehensive, coordinated, and sustainable approach was encompassed. In 
the absence of this, DDR floundered resulted in reigniting of fighting as 
Angola demonstrated. Also in the absence of re-emergence of outright war 
ineffectively reintegrated ex-combatants only went so far; there came a time 
when disillusioned and enflamed ex-combatants shifted from an acquiescent 
mood to a confrontational one against the state. (Dzinesa 2007, 87–88) 
 
DDR programs address the situation of ex-combatants in a number of ways. Fighters 
often find it difficult to return to family and home communities. According to Bauer, 
Fiala and Levely (2018, 1814): “The common view is that the reintegration of soldiers 
after civil wars is complicated by the lingering effects of trauma among them, as well as 
the resentment and ostracism that they face from receiving communities.” Reintegration 
programs can help to increase acceptance. Transitional justice with (limited) prison 
sentences for crimes committed by former combatants creates accountability and 
opportunity to leave the past behind (Samset 2013). Support offered to ex-combatants 
helps them to deal with trauma and stress, and to internalize norms and values of 
civilian life. If ex-combatants are less marginalized within civil community, they 
become less dependent on their bonds with former combatants and less likely to resort 
to crime. Focusing on paramilitary violence, Restrepo and Muggah (2008) argue that 




Economic support is an important part of most DDR programs. Ex-combatants often 
struggle with staying in legal employment. Several studies have highlighted the 
importance of economic reintegration, as an employee or entrepreneur, to prevent 
recidivism and crime. Colletta (1997) argues that a key challenge of reintegration 
programs is to create legal economic opportunities and to develop job skills for 
demobilized fighters. Ayalew, Dercon and Krishnan (1999, 6) identify the lack of 
economic opportunities as core difficulties in reintegrating ex-combatants and they 
describe young people with little hope of future work as “an army in waiting”.	 They 
argue further that ex-combatants should be helped to settle in rural areas. If ex-
combatant settle predominantly in urban areas, they add further pressure on urban labor 
markets and increase housing shortages (Ayalew, Dercon and Krishnan 1999, 16; see 
also Ayalew, Dercon and Krishnan 2003; Dercon and Ayalew 1998). Studying the 
effect of demobilization on crime in Uganda, Collier (1994, 343) finds: “ […] in the 
short term demobilization significantly increased crime if soldiers lacked access to land, 
but significantly reduced it if they had access”.  Economic reintegration programs also 
provide benefits for the wider community; for example, when ex-combatants build 
infrastructure or attain transferable skills. A general improvement of economic 
conditions makes it more likely that communities accept former fighters, while making 
it less attractive for them to engage in crime.  
 
DDR programs are not without their problems. Often, states and other international 
donors are not fully committed to their implementation; for example, Betancourt (2010) 
noted that the demobilization of the AUC in Medellin reduced crime rates dramatically 
in the short run, but in the long run homicide rates increased, because of poor 
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reintegration of former paramilitaries. Howe (2012, v) also concludes “ […] the more 
combatants who demobilized to an area, the higher the homicide rate in the post-
demobilisation period, holding other causes of homicide constant”, and attributes this to 
the weakness of reintegration programs. Nussio (2018) notes that since ex-combatants 
are only a fraction of the whole population, concentrating resources on this sub-
populations risks diverting attention away from other groups at risk of committing 
crime, such as urban youths in marginalized neighborhoods. Finally, former combatants 
regularly drop out of reintegration programs. Regardless, the participation of former 
combatants in reintegration programs should at least moderate any crime-inducing 
effect that the presence of ex-combatants may have. Post-conflict violent crime rates 
may still increase but less so when a larger number of former combatants participate in 
reintegration programs. Therefore, we test the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2: A larger number of former combatants participating in reintegration 
programs decrease post-conflict crime rates. 
 
The differences between former guerrillas and paramilitaries and different crime 
categories are likely to matter for the second hypothesis as well. We do not expect a 
uniform effect since rebels were demobilized individually, while paramilitaries were 
demobilized collectively.  
 
Research Design 
The empirical analysis relies on information aggregated at the municipal level using 
data on demobilization, violent crime as well as relevant socio-economic control 
variables. The unit of analysis for all models is the Colombian municipality-year 
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including 1,122 municipalities and 11 time points, spanning the period 2003 – 2013.5 
The Colombian government provides detailed statistics on crime rates as well as socio-
economic variables at the municipal level. We report the findings from fixed-effects 
linear regression models with municipal level and year fixed effects. Since we have 
relatively short time series for a large number of cross-sectional units, we estimate the 
models with robust standard errors to correct for any clustering of errors within panels. 
The models include controls for the exposure of a municipality to the conflict and local 
state capacity. We estimate instrumental-variable models (2SLS) to account for possible 
endogeneity, because the location where ex-combatants settle may not be random but 
related to municipal crime levels. 
 
The impact of DDR programs in Colombia has received extensive scholarly attention 
recently (Howe 2012; Daley 2016; Nussio 2018; Kaplan and Nussio 2018a; 2018b). It is 
important to note that the Colombian experience is not necessarily generalizable to 
other conflicts. Most importantly, and reflected in the availability of official data, the 
long-standing civil war in Colombia has not led to the Colombian state to ‘fail’. 
Colombia may therefore be in a better position to reintegrate ex-combatants compared 
to many other post-conflict states. 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES Municipal homicide rates and municipal robbery rates per 
1000 inhabitants are the dependent variables. Homicides and robberies are good proxies 
for violent crime while capturing different dimensions of crime. Homicides are often 
motivated by revenge and perpetrators tend to know their victims. Robberies have an 
economic motivation and perpetrators generally do not know their victims. The main 
source of information is the crime observatory of the Colombian National Police using 
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its statistical data system (Observatorio	del	Delito	–	Sistema	de	Información	
Estadística,	Delincuencial,	Contravencional	y	Operativo	–	SIEDCO). The crime data 
compiled by the Colombian police are generally considered to be of high quality.6  
 
The main public crimes are ‘drugs related’ (34.91%), ‘weapons trafficking’ (32.06%), 
and ‘conspiracy’ (18.76%). The analysis below excludes public crimes, because we 
want to clearly distinguish post-conflict crime from guerrilla and paramilitary activities 
that are related to the on-going Colombian civil war. Instead, we analyze the two major 
types of crime against persons, namely ‘homicides’ (27.61%) and ‘robberies’ (24.63%). 
Other notable types of private crimes are ‘mayhem/battery’ (11.11%), ‘extortion’ 
(8.19%), ‘domestic violence’ (6.15%), ‘kidnapping’ (3.76%), ‘sexual assault/rape’ 
(3.52%) and ‘forced disappearance’ (0.67%). We exclude these categories because we 
suspect more serious underreporting of these types of private crime.  
 
MAIN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES Since our primary interest is the impact of former 
combatants on crime rates, we count the number of ex-combatants who have settled in a 
particular municipality. ‘Ex-Combatants’ estimates the total number of former fighters 
in a municipality. The estimates correct for deceased participants. The main source of 
information is the statistical information system of Colombian Agency for Reintegration 
(ACR) consulted in 2015.7 Following demobilization, most guerrillas started an 
individual reintegration program, while paramilitaries were demobilized collectively as 
part of a peace agreement. Some ex-combatants started their reintegration program 
immediately, but others only after several years. A number of ex-combatants could not 
or did not want to be involved in reintegration. The variable ‘Ex-Combatants, in’ counts 
the number of former combatants who are engaged in the Colombian reintegration 
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program. Our data likely overestimate the share of the ex-combatants who are involved 
in reintegration, because of the way the information on ex-combatants is formally 
administered. ‘Ex-Combatants, out’ measures the number of ex-combatants that is 
registered as uninvolved. Here, we retain the final place of residence for any veteran 
who dropped out of the program, since we can only trace where ex-combatants reside as 
long as they are involved in reintegration. Contrary to our assumption, however, they 
may have moved. Ex-combatants may have left the reintegration program because of 
threats against them and for the same reason they may also have decided to move out of 
the municipality.8 The ‘in’ and ‘out’ variables for each category of former combatants 
are highly correlated.9  
 
The number of combatants per municipality is not normally distributed. A large number 
of municipalities have no former combatants residing at all, while a few communities 
are outliers with a large number of ex-combatants. We therefore use the natural log of 
the original variable (adding one combatant to each municipality). Table 1 summarizes 
the descriptive information for the data on ex-combatants. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 reports the distribution of paramilitaries and guerrillas, both in and out of 
reintegration. In our sample the majority of ex-combatants are paramilitaries, and most 
of them were participating in reintegration. Consequently, the coefficients reported 
below are not directly comparable.  
[Table 2 about here] 
 
CONTROL VARIABLES The models include key control variables identified in the 
existing literature on the determinants of (post-conflict) violent crime (Howe 2012). 
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Controls include how armed conflict affected the municipality, the number of displaced 
persons in the municipality, and the continued presence of ELN, FARC or AUC fighters 
in the municipality. Since in Colombia crime is often linked to the production of illegal 
drugs, we control for presence of coca cultivation in the municipality. Further control 
variables account for other factors thought to determine crime: percentage of youth 
population, urbanization, municipal capacity to tax and infant mortality rate.10  
 
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES There may be reverse causality in relationship between 
the presence of ex-combatants and crime: crime rates may affect where ex-combatants 
prefer to live, or end up living because of lack of choice. To address endogeneity we use 
an instrumental-variables approach. The challenge here is to find a suitable instrument 
for the presence of ex-combatants, where the instruments should be closely related to 
the location decision of former combatants but unaffected by changes in crime rates. 
We propose to use data on the birthplace of ex-combatants, since we considered it 
unlikely that changes in current crime rates affect the probability of ex-combatants 
being born in a particular municipality. Although there is limited information on the 
relocation of former combatants, we argue that they are likely to settle in the place they 
were born or recruited. For example, Podder (2012) observes that ex-combatants settle 
where they were recruited. In her research on remilitarization of rebel groups in 
Colombia, Daly concludes: “there exists a great deal of path dependence, with 
relocation determined by recruitment rather than by individual agency or post-war 
considerations. In particular, individuals should tend to return to where they were 
recruited, underscoring the importance of the geography of recruitment” (Daly 2016, 
86). It is therefore plausible that following demobilization, ex-combatants return to their 
place of recruitment, which is often the same as their place of birth.  
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To appreciate the use of birthplace as an instrument, it is important to note that the 
instrumental-variable models also include municipal and year fixed-effects. It follows 
that the dependent variable measures changes in crime rates rather than levels of crime. 
Birthplace would be a poor instrument for levels of crime, since there is plenty of 
evidence that living in high-crime areas makes it more likely to be recruited into rebel 
and paramilitary groups and that crime rates are structural features of many 
neighborhoods. There is, however, more over-time variation in changes in crime rates, 
and any change in crime rates is unlikely to be related to the number of ex-combatants 
born in a particular municipality more than 20 years ago. Moreover, the fixed-effects 
models also control for any underlying structural conditions that led to crime in the past 
as well as currently and which may also have favored recruitment. 
  
We consider information about the places where former combatants were born, where 
they were recruited and where they are living following demobilization. Guerrilla and 
paramilitary groups recruited from 888 of the 1,122 Colombian municipalities. In the 
paramilitary case, 8% of the 32,508 former combatants report the same birth, 
recruitment and living place; 31% report the same location for residence and birth, and 
15% are living in the area of recruitment. For the guerrillas, 2% of the 17,174 individual 
combatants report the same birth, recruitment and living place; 11% report the same 
location of residence and birth, and 4% are living in the area where they were recruited. 
Former combatants – especially former paramilitaries – regularly reside in either their 
birth or recruitment place. Figure 1 shows the relocation decision of former fighters 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Statistical evaluations of instruments in the models for homicides and robberies indicate 
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that birthplace and place of recruitment cannot be used simultaneously as instruments. 
Below we present the results with birthplace as instrument. Birthplace is operationalized 
as the number of ex-combatants who indicated a particular municipality as their place of 
birth at the time of demobilization. Accordingly, it varies with the number of ex-
combatants who demobilized in any particular year.11 The Appendix (Tables A.6 and 
A.7) shows that birthplace is a strong instrument in all models (Baum et al, 2007). The 
models were estimated in Stata 13 using xtivreg2 (Schaffer 2010). 
 
Empirical Results 
Two sets of models are presented: first the fixed-effects models, next the instrumental-
variables models. Since the key independent variables are logged but the dependent 
variable is linear, the models are linear-log models and the relevant coefficients are best 
interpreted as effect of percentage change. In the robustness section, we report random-
effects linear models that distinguish between the within (over time) and between 
(municipalities) effects (Bell and Jones 2015). For each set of models, we discuss the 
results for homicides and robberies separately 
 
HOMICIDES Table 3 presents the findings for the fixed-effects models for homicide 
rates. All four models include municipal and year fixed effects as well as time-varying 
controls. Model 1 evaluates the effects of the aggregate of all former fighters, while 
Models 2 and 4 separate the effect of former fighters that are enrolled in reintegration 
programs and those that not, or no longer, taking part. Models 3 and 4 separate between 
former paramilitaries (AUC) and guerrillas.  
[Table 3 about here] 
In Model 1, and contrary to the first hypothesis, the presence of former fighters in the 
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municipality does not significantly increase the homicide rate. Disaggregating the total 
number of combatants, however, leads to more interesting findings. Model 3 indicates 
that former paramilitaries significantly increase the homicide rate, while guerrillas lead 
to significantly fewer murders. Moreover, Model 2 shows that any positive correlation 
between former combatants and homicides applies only to the number of ex-combatants 
that is not in reintegration. The presence of more ex-combatants who are in 
reintegration actually reduces the homicide rate. Finally, in Model 4, having more 
former AUC members who are not in reintegration significantly increases the municipal 
homicide rate, while more ex-guerillas enrolled in reintegration programs decrease it. 
These findings support the second hypothesis: a larger number of veterans participating 
in reintegration programs correlates with fewer homicides.  
 
Even though the coefficients for former combatants are often significant, the substantive 
impact is quite limited. The mean value of the homicide rate is 0.337, and an increase of 
the number of ex-combatants in reintegration with 10% reduces it with 0.001. If 10% 
more ex-combatants are not in reintegration, the crime rate increases by 0.006. To have 
a measurable impact on the number of murders, we consider the impact of doubling the 
number of ex-combatants. To do so for ex-combatants who are not in reintegration 
increases the mean homicide rate by 0.04, which is about 10% of the standard error of 
the homicide rate or 4 additional murders in a city of 100,000 inhabitants. At the same 
time, doubling the number of ex-combatants in reintegration leads to 2 fewer 
homicides.12 
 
The results for the controls are largely intuitive. The presence of active guerrilla (ELN, 
FARC) or paramilitary (AUC) forces correlates with increased homicide rates, as does 
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the presence of displaced people. We do not observe a clear correlation between wealth 
or poverty and murder rates. Contrary to a possible youth-bulge effect, a higher 
percentage of young people in a municipality is associated with lower homicide rates. 
Illicit economic activities such as coca cultivation tend to increase homicide rates, but 
we do not find a difference between rural and urban areas. 
[Table 4] 
Table 4 presents the results of the instrumental-variable models (2SLS) replicating the 
models in Table 3. In columns IV-1 and IV-2, information on the birthplace of ex-
combatants is used as an instrument, while in columns IV-3 and IV-4, the birthplace of 
former paramilitaries and guerrillas is used to instrument ex-paramilitaries and 
guerrillas respectively. Table 3 summarizes the coefficients of interests of nine 2SLS/IV 
models. The Appendix (Table A6) gives the full models. The p-values and F-statistic of 
the first stage of all models indicate instrumental relevance showing that birthplace is a 
strong instrument (Stock & Yogo 2005).  
 
The instrumental-variable analysis shows that some of the findings presented in Table 3 
may be biased because of reverse causality. In Model IV-1, the presence of ex-
combatants actually significantly decreases the municipal homicide rate. The negative 
correlation between former combatants in reintegration and homicides is consistent 
across fixed-effects and instrumental-variable models (IV-2). Similarly, the models in 
IV-3 and IV-4 show that former paramilitaries in reintegration significantly decrease 
homicide rates. Yet former paramilitaries who are not in reintegration increase the 
murder rates. Compared to the fixed-effects models in Table 4, the IV models for 
former guerrillas show similar associations, although often no longer statistically 
significant, between former guerrillas and municipal murder rates. Overall, we find a 
	 23	
stronger association between former paramilitaries, compared to former guerrillas, and 
homicides. Notably, paramilitaries in reintegration decrease homicide rates, while a 
larger number out of reintegration leads to more homicides. 
 
ROBBERIES Table 5 reports the results for the fixed-effects models (with municipal and 
year fixed effects) for municipal robbery rates. In all models we observe a positive and 
generally statistically significant association between the number of ex-combatants and 
robberies, suggesting that ex-combatants increase the number of robberies. Model 7, 
moreover, shows that the positive effect holds for former paramilitaries as well as 
guerrillas. Yet distinguishing between ex-combatants in and out of reintegration 
programs (Models 6) indicates that the positive effect is largely attributable to former 
combatants who are not in reintegration. Finally, Model 8 finds that only the number of 
former paramilitaries who are not in reintegration has a statistically significant effect on 
increasing crime. In contrast, a larger number of guerrillas, regardless of whether they 
are in reintegration or not, appears to increases the robbery rate in a municipality. So 
far, these findings seem to provide support for Hypothesis 1 in the case of robbery rates. 
The evidence for Hypothesis 2 is more mixed; engagement in reintegration programs 
only appears to matter for former paramilitaries.  
[Table 5] 
Substantively, a 10% increase of the number of ex-combatants increases the robbery 
rate by .012 (where the average robbery rate is 0.805), but this is entirely attributable to 
ex-combatants who are not in reintegration. Doubling the number of veterans increases 
the robbery rate by 0.09, which means approximately 15 additional robberies in a city 
with 100,000 inhabitants. Of course, the number of robberies is much larger than the 
number of homicides. Municipalities between 90,000 and 110,000 citizens experienced 
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on average 200 robberies (maximum is 900) and 40 murders (maximum is 144) in any 
year. If the number of former paramilitaries increases with 10%, the robbery rate goes 
up by 0.006 while 10% more guerrillas lead to an increase of .018.  
 
The results for the controls for the robbery rate models diverge notably from the 
homicide rate models suggesting that both types of violent crime are associated with 
different factors. The presence of active guerrillas (ELN, FARC) is unrelated with 
robbery rates, while paramilitaries (AUC) in a community correlate with lower robbery 
rates. Rural areas have lower robbery rates compared to urban areas. We do not observe 
a significant association of wealth, poverty or coca cultivation with robberies. As in the 
models for homicide rates, a higher percentage of young people in a municipality 
correlates with lower robbery rates while having more displaced people is associated 
with increased robberies. The overall fit of models for robbery rates is lower than for 
homicide rates, reflecting the higher variability of the former. 
[Table 7] 
Analogous to the analysis of municipal homicide rates, Table 7 presents the 2SLS 
instrumental-variable analysis of robbery rates. In the Appendix we report the full 
models (Table A7.1) and statistics indicating that birthrate is a relevant and strong 
instrument (Table A7.2).  
 
The results of the IV/2SLS analysis raise some doubts about the findings of the fixed-
effects models presented above (Table 6). Most notably, the IV models indicate that 
veterans, in particular ex-combatants in reintegration and former paramilitaries, may 
actually decrease robbery rates. This suggests that former combatants move to areas 
with higher robbery rates rather than the other way around. However, even correcting 
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for possible reverse causality, we still find a positive (and significant) effect of former 
combatants who are not in reintegration programs. The IV models therefore contradict 
Hypothesis 1 but lend support for Hypothesis 2. Finally, the positive association 
between former guerillas observed in the fixed-effects analysis becomes insignificant in 
the IV analysis. Still, former guerrillas (even in reintegration) are never associated with 
fewer robberies.  
 
ROBUSTNESS To further assess the robustness of the findings presented above, we have 
run a number of alternative model specifications. Considering the high correlation 
between the variables measuring the number of ex-combatants in and out of 
reintegration respectively, we entered these variables separately and expressed as 
percentage of the total number of veterans (see Appendix B). The findings are 
consistent with the models presented above, although generally they give less support 
for any effect of the number of ex-combatants in reintegration programs.  
 
Alternatively, we specified random-effects models distinguishing over time (within) and 
cross-sectional (between) effects (Appendix C). The results for the measures for the 
over-time effect of ex-combatants are consistent with those presented above. The 
coefficients for the cross-sectional measures suggest that veterans are associated with 
less homicides but with more robberies. These results are, however, highly uncertain. 
They are often statistically insignificant and the models do not correct for reverse 
causality. 
 
The random-effects models include the same controls as the fixed-effects models but 
also include some additional time-invariant controls. The presence of illegal mining in 
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the district is not significant. In the case of Colombia, altitude is occasionally suggested 
as a proxy for colonial experience and possibly quality of governance (Arjona 2017). 
We find a statistically significant association with reduced homicides but not with 
robberies. Distance from Bogota could also be seen as a proxy for lower quality of 
governance, but we observe lower, rather than higher, homicide and robbery rates.13  
 
Conclusions 
In contrast to most countries affected by long-running conflicts, in Colombia there 
exists detailed information on the experience of former fighters, their engagement with 
reintegration programs as well as extensive statistical information on crime rates and 
socio-economic background conditions at the municipal level. We have leveraged this 
information to evaluate whether the presence of demobilized combatants can indeed be 
associated with increasing crime rates, as commonly asserted, and whether reintegration 
programs can modify this impact, as often doubted.  	
We have examined the dynamics of violent crime in Colombia in an effort to 
understand the regional dynamics of post-conflict violence. The focus has been the 
presence of ex-combatants who participated in reintegration. In other words, do 
communities with more ex-combatants experience more crime and does reintegration 
matter? Importantly, the analysis distinguishes between former paramilitaries and 
guerrillas, but also between different types of crime – homicides and robberies. Since 
the decision of former combatants on where to settle is not random, we further correct 
for possible reverse causality. 
 
In Colombia, as in most countries, underreporting of crime in official statistics is a 
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serious problem. People may simply not bother to report property crimes when they are 
not insured and do not expect the police to take action. Lack of police capacity may also 
lead to nonrandom underreporting of homicides. Our analyses, however, do not provide 
clear evidence suggesting that state capacity affects the number of (reported) crimes. 
Further, since the data of ex-combatants are also official statistics, a reasonable 
expectation would be that municipalities that are able to keep track of ex-combatants are 
also better able to record crime, but generally we do not find a positive correlation 
between ex-combatants and crime. 
 
Since 2016, the Colombian peace process has gained momentum making the 
reintegration of ex-combatants highly policy relevant. First of all, we find very limited 
support for a uniform ‘violent veterans’ effect on crime. Concerns about the presence of 
veterans as a cause of crime would seem exaggerated. Rather, any effect is sensitive to 
contrasting former paramilitaries and guerrillas, as well as the number of ex-combatants 
involved in reintegration or not. The presence of former paramilitaries who are not in a 
reintegration program is linked with increased homicide and robbery rates. Controlling 
for possible endogeneity, the number of paramilitaries in reintegration is associated with 
lower homicide and robbery rates. Former guerillas, regardless of whether they are in or 
out of a reintegration program, are associated with increased robberies, but when they 
are in reintegration, guerrillas are associated with fewer homicides. A first policy 
implication is that the reintegration of ex-combatants matters for controlling post-
conflict crime. Crime has marred the peace processes in several Central American 
countries such as Nicaragua and El Salvador. Our data for Colombia suggest that this 
cannot simply be attributed to ex-combatants and that, moreover, inclusive reintegration 
programs can even lead to a reduction of crime.  
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In the instrumental-variable models the presence of ex-combatants is generally 
associated with fewer homicides and robberies. The different findings of instrument-
variable models suggest that ex-combatants (have to) settle in areas with high crime 
rates. Rather than increasing crime, veterans have to return to civilian life in areas that 
are increasingly crime-affected. The distinction between former paramilitaries and 
guerrillas, however, persists in instrumental-variable models. In our opinion, the most 
plausible explanation is that guerrillas more often had to settle in municipalities 
unfamiliar to them, and that they often have a relatively weak socio-economic position. 
Both factors make them more prone to engage in property crimes.  
 
A second policy implication is therefore that reintegration programs should not 
exclusively focus on ex-combatants but rather consider the community where ex-
combatants have settled. In line with Kaplan and Nussio (2018b), our analysis 
highlights the role of communities in facilitating reintegration and avoiding recidivism. 
It matters that veterans often end up in areas where crime is a problem. Rather than 
focusing on veterans, the Colombian government has to extend its policing authority 
across the country. Particularly municipalities that were controlled by rebels run the risk 
to become a ‘no man’s land’. Since the socio-economic vulnerability of some veterans 
may well cause them to engage in (property) crime, it is worthwhile for the Colombia 
government, as well as external donors, to address the difficult circumstance in which 
some veterans have to provide for their livelihood. Our research indicates that keeping 
veterans in reintegration programs has a positive impact, and that reintegration 
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Maps and Figures 
 
 




Table 1: Ex Combatants Descriptive Statistics Variable	 Mean Std. Dev Min Max N Ex-Combatants	(log)	 1.44 1.65 0 8.75 14,562 Ex-AUC	(log)	 1.15 1.57 0 8.45 14,562 Ex-Guerrilla	(log)	 .79 1.15 0 8.72 14,562 Ex-Combatants,	in	(log) 1.39 1.60 0 8.61 14,562 Ex-AUC,	in	(log) 1.10 1.51 0 8.29 14,562 Ex-Guerrilla,	in	(log) .78 113 0 8.15 14,562 Ex-Combatants,	out	(log) .51 .96 0 6.95 14,562 Ex-AUC,	out	(log) .47 .92 0 6.87 14,562 Ex-Guerrilla,	out	(log) .11 .42 0 6.04 14,562 
 
 
Table	2:	Ex-Combatants	and	Reintegration		 Total	(%)	 In-sample	(%)	 In-reintegration	(%)*	 Not	in-reintegration	(%)*	
Ex-Combatants 56,358 49,683 45,860  3,822 




















Table 3: Ex-Combatants and Municipal Homicide Rates, 2003 – 2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Ex-Combatants (log) -0.00    
 (0.01)    
Ex-Combatants, in (log)  -0.03**   
  (0.01)   
Ex-Combatants, out (log)  0.05***   
  (0.02)   
AUC (log)   0.02**  
   (0.01)  
Guerrilla (log)   -0.05***  
   (0.01)  
AUC, in (log)    -0.00 
    (0.01) 
AUC, out (log)    0.05** 
    (0.02) 
Guerrilla, in (log)    -0.06*** 
    (0.01) 
Guerrilla, out (log)    0.03 
    (0.02) 
Displaced (log) 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Rural (%) -0.54 -0.56 -0.45 -0.52 
 (0.55) (0.55) (0.55) (0.55) 
Youth (%) -2.05** -1.84** -1.94** -1.70* 
 (0.71) (0.70) (0.70) (0.70) 
Coca Cultivation (log) 0.02* 0.02* 0.02* 0.02* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Taxes (p.c.) -0.11 -0.14 -0.06 -0.08 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Infant Mortality Rate 0.00# 0.00# 0.00# 0.00# 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ELN in community 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
FARC in community 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 0.03** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
AUC in community 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 0.97** 0.95** 0.89** 0.90** 
 (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) 
     
Observations 10,903 10,903 10,903 10,903 
R-squared 0.097 0.099 0.101 0.104 
All independent variables lagged by one period; Fixed-effects models with municipal 
(ID_Muni) and year fixed effects; Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on 




Table 4: Ex-Combatants and Municipal Homicide Rates, 2003 – 2012 (2SLS, IV 
models) 
 (IV-1) (IV-2) (IV-3) (IV-4) 
     
Ex-Combatants (log) -0.14***    
 (0.05)    
Ex-Combatants, in (log)  -0.11**   
  (0.04)   
Ex-Combatants, out (log)  0.17**   
  (0.06)   
Ex-AUC (log)   -0.19***  
   (0.53)  
Ex-Guerrilla (log)   -0.07  
   (0.07)  
Ex-AUC, in (log)    -0.13*** 
    (0.04) 
Ex-AUC, out (log)    0.24*** 
    (0.06) 
Ex-Guerrilla, in (log)    -0.07 
    (0.06) 
Ex-Guerrilla, out (log)    0.08 
    (0.33) 














     
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, # p<0.1; 
Each of coefficients instrumented in separate models; all nine models reported fully in 
Appendix Table A6. All reported independent variables are lagged by one period and 
logged. The following variables are included in all models but not reported: Displaced 
(log), Rural (perc), Youth (perc), Coca Cultivation (log), Taxes (p.c.), Infant Mortality 
Rate, ELN, FARC, and AUC in community, Year dummies. Number of observation = 





Table 5: Ex-Combatants and Municipal Robbery Rates, 2003 – 2013 
 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
     
Ex-Combatants (log) 0.12***    
 (0.02)    
Ex-Combatants, in (log)  0.03   
  (0.02)   
Ex-Combatants, out (log)  0.18***   
  (0.04)   
AUC (log)   0.06***  
   (0.02)  
Guerrilla (log)   0.18***  
   (0.03)  
AUC, in (log)    -0.02 
    (0.02) 
AUC, out (log)    0.14** 
    (0.05) 
Guerrilla, in (log)    0.15*** 
    (0.03) 
Guerrilla, out (log)    0.11 
    (0.09) 
Displaced (log) 0.03** 0.03** 0.02* 0.02* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Rural (%) -2.35* -2.42* -2.53** -2.72** 
 (0.98) (0.98) (0.97) (0.98) 
Youth (%) -8.56*** -7.87*** -8.56*** -7.81*** 
 (1.96) (1.92) (1.93) (1.90) 
Coca Cultivation (log) -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Taxes (p.c.) 0.70 0.60 0.46 0.40 
 (0.76) (0.75) (0.74) (0.74) 
Infant Mortality Rate -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ELN in community 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
FARC in community -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
AUC in community -0.12*** -0.10*** -0.09** -0.07* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Constant 3.54*** 3.48*** 3.66*** 3.67*** 
 (0.70) (0.70) (0.70) (0.71) 
     
Observations 12,051 12,051 12,051 12,051 
R-squared 0.066 0.070 0.075 0.078 
All independent variables lagged by one period; Fixed-effects models with municipal 
(ID_Muni) and year fixed effects; Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered on 




Table 6: Ex-Combatants and Municipal Robbery Rates, 2003 – 2013 
(2SLS, IV models) 
 (IV-5) (IV-6) (IV-7) (IV-8) 
     
Ex-Combatants -0.71***    
 (0.16)    
Ex-Combatants, in  -0.40***   
  (0.10)   
Ex-Combatants, out  0.86***   
  (0.14)   
Ex-AUC   -0.84***  
   (0.21)  
Ex-Guerrilla   -0.11  
   (0.19)  
Ex-AUC, in    -0.41*** 
    (0.11) 
Ex-AUC, out    0.79*** 
    (0.18) 
Ex-Guerrilla, in    -0.05 
    (0.17) 
Ex-Guerrilla, out    1.04# 
    (0.63) 











     
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, # 
p<0.1; Each of coefficients instrumented in separate models; all nine models 
reported fully in Appendix Table A7. All reported independent variables are 
lagged by one period and logged. The following variables are included in all 
models but not reported: Displaced (log), Rural (perc), Youth (perc), Coca 
Cultivation (log), Taxes (p.c.), Infant Mortality Rate, ELN, FARC, and AUC in 
community, Year dummies. Number of observation = 12,057. Robust estimator 
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Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics and Definition of Control Variables 	The	data	are	from	official	sources	and	the	municipality	panel	of	The	Centre	for	Economic	Development	Studies	(CEDE1).	The	dataset	is	an	unbalanced	panel	containing	information	for	every	municipality	in	Colombia	(1,122	in	total)	for	each	year	between	2003	and	2014.	For	some	variables,	information	was	available	since	1993	or	2000,	which	we	used	to	estimate	missing	data.			Definition	of	control	variables:	
• Logarithm of displacement people: natural logarithm of total forced 
displacement (arrival of people). 
Source: CEDE and Acción Social. 
• Presence of guerrilla (ELN): dummy of presence of ELN in municipality. 
Source: CEDE and defence ministry. 
• Presence of guerrilla (Farc): dummy of presence of FARC in municipality. 
Source: CEDE and defence ministry. 
• Presence of paramilitaries: dummy of presence of AUC in municipality. 
Source: CEDE and defence ministry. 
• Rural index: rural population divided into total population. 
Source: CEDE and National Statistical system (DANE). 
• Youth index: youth population (between 15 to 24 years) divided into total 
population. 
Source: CEDE and National Statistical system (DANE). 
• Altitude: the height above sea level of a location. 
Source: CEDE 
• Distance of Bogotá (Capital city): linear distance to Bogotá - km (Kilometers) 	
1  Dataset accessed in April 2015. For further information, see 
https://datoscede.uniandes.edu.co/contenido.php/1/about-cede-data-center/ 
	 41	
Source: CEDE  
• Taxes per capita: income from total taxes divide into total population. 
Source: National Planning Department (DNP) 
• Infant mortality rate 
Source: CEDE and National Statistical system (DANE) 
• Illegal mining: dummy indicating the presence of illegal mining. 
Source: different reports by national police, ministry of mining and energy, 
indepaz and others. 
• Logarithm of coca crop: natural logarithm of cultivated area of total coca - hm² 
(Hectares) 
Source: Integrated Illicit Crop Monitoring System (SIMCI). 	
Table	A1:	Descriptive	Statistics	–	Control	Variables		
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES N mean Sd Min Max 
      
Homicides rate 12,004 0.337 0.418 0 7.186 
Robberies rate 13,157 0.805 1.221 0 20.808 
Presence of ELN 14,557 0.186 0.390 0 1 
Presence of FARC  14,557 0.397 0.489 0 1 
Presence of AUC 14,557 0.147 0.354 0 1 
Natural logarithm of total forced displacement 14,562 3.674 2.136 0 10.86 
Ratio: rural population/total population 14,562 0.581 0.242 0.001 1 
% youth population 14,562 0.185 0.019 0.107 0.442 
Natural logarithm of coca crops 14,562 0.767 1.862 0 9.589 
Taxes Per capita 14,562 0.056 0.084 0 2.236 
Infant mortality rate  14,562 23.026 9.144 2.720 91.97 
Presence of illegal mining 14,562 0.175 0.380 0 1 
Altitude 14,562 1,153 1,158 1 25,221 
Distance from municipality to Bogota 14,562 321.3 194.6 0 1,271 




Table	A2:	Pairwise	Correlations			 Ex-Combatants	 Ex-Combatants,	in	 Ex-Combatants,	out	 Ex-Combatants,	in	%	Ex-Combatants,	in	 0.9986	 	1.0000	 	 	Ex-Combatants,	out	 0.8672	 		0.8551	 		1.0000	 	Ex-Combatants,	in	%	 0.9077	 		0.9132	 		0.9116	 		1.0000	Ex-Combatants,	out	%	 0.5349	 		0.4903	 		0.6458	 		0.3750		 Ex-AUC	 Ex-AUC,	in	 Ex-AUC,	out	 Ex-AUC,	in%	Ex-AUC,	in	 0.9982	 1.0000		 	 	Ex-AUC,	out	 0.8995	 		0.8882	 		1.0000		 	Ex-AUC,	in%	 0.8591	 		0.8598	 		0.5867	 		1.0000		Ex-AUC,	out%	 0.5899	 		0.5410	 		0.6658	 		0.4757		 Ex-Guerrilla	 Ex-Guerrilla,	in	 Ex-Guerrilla,	out	 Ex-Guerrilla,	in%	Ex-Guerrilla,	in	 0.9991	 1.0000		 	 	Ex-Guerrilla,	out	 0.6902	 0.6758	 		1.0000		 	Ex-Guerrilla,	in%	 0.8835	 0.8858	 		0.3592	 		1.0000		Ex-Guerrilla,	out%	 0.3642	 0.3248	 		0.5703	 		0.2476			 	
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Table A3: Ex-Combatants and Municipal Homicide Rates, Alternative Specification 
         
Ex-Combatants, in -0.00        
 (0.01)        
Ex-Combatants, out  0.02*       
  (0.01)       
Ex-Combatants   -0.03* -0.00     
   (0.01) (0.01)     
Ex-Combatants, in%   0.00**      
   (0.00)      
Ex-Combatants, out%    0.00     
    (0.00)     
Ex-AUC, in     0.02**    
     (0.01)    
Ex-Guerrilla, in     -0.05***    
     (0.01)    
Ex-AUC, out      0.03*   
      (0.01)   
Ex-Guerrilla, out      -0.03   
      (0.02)   
Ex-AUC       0.05*** 0.03** 
       (0.01) (0.01) 
Ex-Guerrilla       -0.06*** -0.05*** 
       (0.02) (0.01) 
Ex-AUC, in%       -0.00***  
       (0.00)  
Ex-Guerrilla, in%       0.00  
       (0.00)  
Ex-AUC, out%        -0.00 
        (0.00) 
Ex-Guerrilla, out%        0.00 
        (0.00) 
Constant 0.97** 0.96** 0.96** 0.97** 0.90** 0.95** 0.90** 0.89** 
 (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) 
         
R-squared 0.097 0.098 0.098 0.097 0.101 0.098 0.103 0.101 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, # p<0.1. All reported independent 
variables are lagged by one period and logged. The following variables are included in all models but not 
reported: Displaced (log), Rural (perc), Youth (perc), Coca Cultivation (log), Taxes (p.c.), Infant Mortality 
Rate, ELN, FARC, and AUC in community, Year dummies. Number of observation = 10,903. Robust 
estimator on municipality; number of municipalities = 1,093. 		 	
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Table A4: Ex-Combatants and Municipal Robbery Rates, Alternative Specification 
 
Ex-Combatants, in 0.12***        
 (0.02)        
Ex-Combat, out  0.21***       
  (0.03)       
Ex-Combatants   -0.05 0.13***     
   (0.03) (0.02)     
Ex-Combat, in%   0.02***      
   (0.00)      
Ex-Combat, out%    -0.01*     
    (0.00)     
Ex-AUC, in     0.06***    
     (0.02)    
Ex-Guerrilla, in     0.19***    
     (0.03)    
Ex-AUC, out      0.17***   
      (0.03)   
Ex-Guerrilla, out      0.24**   
      (0.09)   
Ex-AUC       0.11*** 0.06*** 
       (0.03) (0.02) 
Ex-Guerrilla       0.30*** 0.19*** 
       (0.06) (0.03) 
Ex-AUC, in%       -0.00***  
       (0.00)  
Ex-Guerrilla, in%       -0.00**  
       (0.00)  
Ex-AUC, out%        -0.00 
        (0.00) 
Ex-Guerrilla, out%        -0.01# 
        (0.00) 
Constant 3.54*** 3.47*** 3.46*** 3.54*** 3.66*** 3.54*** 3.63*** 3.64*** 
 (0.70) (0.70) (0.70) (0.70) (0.70) (0.71) (0.70) (0.70) 
R-squared 0.066 0.070 0.073 0.066 0.075 0.073 0.081 0.075 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, # p<0.1. All reported independent 
variables are lagged by one period and logged. The following variables are included in all models but not 
reported: Displaced (log), Rural (perc), Youth (perc), Coca Cultivation (log), Taxes (p.c.), Infant Mortality Rate, 
ELN, FARC, and AUC in community, Year dummies. Number of observations = 12,051. Robust estimator on 






  Table A5: Ex-Combatants, Homicides and Robberies, random effects, within-between effects  
  Homicide rate, 2003-2012 Robbery rate, 2003-2013 
         
Ex-Combatants diff -0.04***    0.10***    
 (0.01)    (0.02)    
Ex-Combatants mean -0.02*    0.11***    
 (0.01)    (0.02)    
AUC diff  -0.01    0.05***   
  (0.01)    (0.01)   
AUC mean  -0.01    -0.03   
  (0.01)    (0.02)   
Guerrilla diff  -0.06***    0.18***   
  (0.01)    (0.03)   
Guerrilla mean  -0.04**    0.41***   
  (0.01)    (0.05)   
Ex-Combat, in - diff   -0.07***    0.02  
   (0.01)    (0.02)  
Ex-Combat, in - mean   -0.02#    0.08*  
   (0.01)    (0.03)  
Ex-Combat, out - diff   0.08***    0.19***  
   (0.02)    (0.04)  
Ex-Combat, out - mean   -0.00    0.09  
   (0.02)    (0.06)  
Ex-AUC, in - diff    -0.05***    -0.03 
    (0.01)    (0.02) 
Ex-AUC, in - mean    -0.03*    -0.07# 
    (0.01)    (0.04) 
Ex-AUC, out - diff    0.09***    0.16*** 
    (0.02)    (0.04) 
Ex-AUC, out - mean    0.04*    0.05 
    (0.02)    (0.06) 
Ex-Guerrilla, in - diff    -0.08***    0.14*** 
    (0.01)    (0.03) 
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Ex-Guerrilla, in - mean    -0.00    0.32*** 
    (0.02)    (0.05) 
Ex-Guerrilla, out - diff    0.04#    0.13 
    (0.02)    (0.09) 
Ex-Guerrilla, out - mean    -0.14***    0.39* 
    (0.03)    (0.16) 
ELN diff 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
ELN - mean 0.09** 0.10** 0.09** 0.10*** 0.06 0.01 0.05 -0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) 
FARC diff 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04*** -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
FARC mean 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.17** 0.03 0.17** 0.05 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
AUC diff 0.05*** 0.04** 0.06*** 0.05*** -0.12*** -0.08** -0.09*** -0.06* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
AUC mean 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.16 0.03 0.14 -0.05 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.19) (0.16) (0.18) (0.15) 
Displaced (log) diff 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02# 0.02# 0.02# 0.02* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Displaced (log) mean 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.03 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Rural % diff 0.34 0.38 0.22 0.21 -3.39*** -3.09*** -3.62*** -3.40*** 
 (0.51) (0.51) (0.51) (0.51) (0.85) (0.83) (0.85) (0.85) 
Rural % mean -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -1.36*** -1.16*** -1.34*** -1.14*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Youth % diff -2.20*** -1.96** -1.87** -1.64** -7.23*** -8.16*** -6.44*** -7.37*** 
 (0.60) (0.60) (0.59) (0.60) (1.91) (1.94) (1.88) (1.91) 
Youth % mean -0.90* -0.92* -0.90* -1.06** -5.11*** -5.05*** -5.04*** -4.60*** 
 (0.39) (0.38) (0.39) (0.38) (1.35) (1.31) (1.33) (1.22) 
Coca (log) diff 0.02* 0.02# 0.02* 0.02* -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Coca (log) mean 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03*** -0.04** -0.03** -0.04** -0.03* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
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Taxes p.c. diff -0.15 -0.06 -0.21 -0.11 1.18 0.86 1.07 0.77 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.74) (0.73) (0.73) (0.72) 
Taxes p.c. mean -0.09 -0.05 -0.10 -0.05 3.34*** 3.13*** 3.30*** 3.09*** 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.49) (0.45) (0.49) (0.45) 
IMR, diff 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00** -0.00* -0.00# -0.01* -0.01* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
IMR, mean -0.00* -0.00* -0.00* -0.00* -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* -0.01* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Illegal production -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.07 -0.05 -0.08 -0.06 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) 
Altitude -0.00** -0.00* -0.00** -0.00* 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Distance from Bogota -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00** -0.00 -0.00** -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 0.48*** 0.49*** 0.48*** 0.51*** 2.53*** 2.41*** 2.53*** 2.37*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.26) (0.25) (0.26) (0.24) 
         
Observations 10,906 10,906 10,906 10,906 12,054 12,054 12,054 12,054 
Number of ID_Muni 1,093 1,093 1,093 1,093 1,098 1,098 1,098 1,098 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, # p<0.1 Random Effects GLS models distinguishing 
between and within effects. 	
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Appendix	D:	Full	Instrumental	Variable	Models	and	Statistics	The	main	text	summarizes	the	IV/2SLS	models.	Below	the	full	second	stage	of	the	IV	models	are	presented.	Further,	we	provide	the	first	stage	coefficient	and	statistical	significance	of	the	instrument	as	well	as	appropriate	statistics	to	evaluate	the	strength	of	the	instruments	used.			
Table A6.1: Ex-Combatants and Municipal Homicide Rates, 2003 – 2012, IV/2SLS Models Second Stage 
 (6.1) (6.2) (6.3) (6.4) (6.5) (6.6) (6.7) (6.8) (6.9) 
          
Ex-Combatants (log) -0.14**         
 (0.05)         
Ex-Combatants, in (log)  -0.11** -0.09**       
  (0.04) (0.03)       
Ex-Combatants, out (log)  0.12*** 0.17**       
  (0.03) (0.06)       
AUC (log)    -0.19*** 0.01     
    (0.05) (0.02)     
Guerrilla (log)    0.04# -0.07     
    (0.02) (0.07)     
AUC, in (log)      -0.13*** -0.11*** -0.02 -0.02 
      (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) 
AUC, out (log)      0.17*** 0.24*** 0.06*** 0.05 
      (0.04) (0.06) (0.01) (0.05) 
Guerrilla, in (log)      -0.04*** -0.06*** -0.07 -0.06 
      (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.05) 
Guerrilla, out (log)      -0.02 -0.05# 0.02 0.08 
      (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.33) 
Displaced (log) 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Rural (percent) -0.12 0.01 0.07 -0.34 0.18 -0.02 0.10 0.12 0.05 
 (0.38) (0.36) (0.36) (0.40) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.50) 
Youth (percent) 0.09 0.15 0.21 -0.35 -0.28 0.06 0.17 -0.09 0.04 
 (0.49) (0.47) (0.48) (0.48) (0.45) (0.45) (0.46) (0.49) (0.95) 
Coca Cultivation (log) 0.01# 0.01 0.01 0.02# 0.01 0.01# 0.01# 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Taxes (p.c.) 0.09 -0.04 -0.10 0.14 0.05 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) 
Infant Mortality Rate 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ELN in community 0.02# 0.02* 0.02* 0.03** 0.03* 0.02* 0.02* 0.03* 0.03* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
FARC in community 0.03*** 0.02** 0.02* 0.03*** 0.02* 0.02** 0.02* 0.02* 0.02* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
AUC in community -0.01 0.04*** 0.07*** -0.02 0.03# 0.04** 0.05*** 0.04** 0.04* 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
          
R-squared -0.014 0.048 0.043 -0.087 0.060 0.045 0.038 0.064 0.062 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, # p<0.1; Coefficients in bold are instrumented; Number of 
observations: 10,909; Number of municipalities: 1,093. Municipal and Year fixed effects 
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Table	A6.2:	Ex-Combatants	and	Municipal	Homicide	Rates,	2003	–	2012,	IV/2SLS	Models	Statistics		 Model	6.1	 Model		6.2	 Model		6.3	 Model		6.4	 Model		6.5	 Model		6.6	 Model		6.7	 Model		6.8	 Model		6.9	Instrumented	 Ex-Combatants,	all	 Ex-Combatants,	in	 Ex-Combatants,	out	 Ex-AUC,	all	 Ex-Guerrilla,	all	 Ex-	AUC,	in	 Ex-	AUC,	out	 Ex-Guerrilla,	in	 Ex-	Guerrilla,	out	Excluded	Instrument	 Birthplace	All	 Birthplace	All	 Birthplace	All	 Birthplace	AUC	 Birthplace	Guerrilla	 Birthplace	AUC	 Birthplace	AUC	 Birthplace	Guerrilla	 Birthplace	Guerrilla	First	stage	coefficient	instrument	 -0.102***	(0.010)	 0.131***	(0.007)	 -0.082***	(0.006)	 0.095***	(0.011)	 0.112***	(0.011)	 0.127***	(0.007)	 -0.075***		(0.006)	 .117***	(0.010)	 -0.023***	(0.005)	Relevance	Sanderson-Windmeijer	F-test	excluded	instrument	
106.43	(p	=	0.000)	 402.44		(p	=	0.000)	 208.91		(p	=	0.000)	 73.67		(p	=	0.000)	 110.91		(p	=	0.000)	 345.55		(p	=	0.000)	 167.61		(p	=	0.000)	 139.33		(p	=	0.000)	 19.52		(p	=	0.000)	
Degrees	of	Freedom	 9797	 9796	 9796	 9796	 9796	 9794	 9794	 9794	 9794	Underidentification	Kleibergen-Paap	rk	LM	statistic,	Chi2(1)	 91.20	(p	=	0.000)	 304.59		(p	=	0.000)	 194.95	(p	=	0.000)	 59.30		(p	=	0.000)		 103.37		(p	=	0.000)	 252.09		(p	=	0.000)	 166.92	(p	=	0.000)	 127.43		(p	=	0.000)	 19.28		(p	=	0.000)	Weak	Instrument	Kleibergen-Paap	rk	Wald	F	statistic	 106.43	 402.44	 208.91	 73.67	 110.91	 345.77	 167.618	 139.33	 19.52	Notes:	All	instrumented	variables	as	well	as	instruments	are	logged.			 	
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Table A7.1: Ex-Combatants and Municipal Robbery Rates, 2003 – 2013, IV/2SLS Models Second Stage 
 (7.1) (7.2) (7.3) (7.4) (7.5) (7.6) (7.7) (7.8) (7.9) 
          
Ex-Combatants (log) -0.71***         
 (0.16)         
Ex-Combatants, in (log)  -0.40*** -0.29***       
  (0.10) (0.07)       
Ex-Combatants, out (log)  0.61*** 0.86***       
  (0.09) (0.14)       
AUC (log)    -0.84*** 0.15***     
    (0.21) (0.04)     
Guerrilla (log)    0.61*** -0.11     
    (0.10) (0.19)     
AUC, in (log)      -0.41*** -0.33*** 0.03 0.04 
      (0.11) (0.09) (0.03) (0.04) 
AUC, out (log)      0.58*** 0.79*** 0.17*** 0.03 
      (0.12) (0.18) (0.04) (0.09) 
Guerrilla, in (log)      0.21*** 0.13*** -0.05 0.04 
      (0.03) (0.02) (0.17) (0.10) 
Guerrilla, out (log)      0.14* 0.05 0.38** 1.04# 
      (0.07) (0.08) (0.12) (0.63) 
Displaced (log) 0.01 0.02* 0.03** -0.01 0.03*** 0.02# 0.02** 0.03*** 0.03** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Rural (percent) -3.43*** -2.74*** -2.49*** -4.39*** -2.15*** -3.18*** -2.78*** -2.77*** -3.62*** 
 (0.85) (0.66) (0.66) (0.96) (0.65) (0.66) (0.64) (0.62) (0.89) 
Youth (percent) -4.95** -4.89*** -4.74*** -7.54*** -7.00*** -5.57*** -5.24*** -5.59*** -4.18* 
 (1.56) (1.32) (1.33) (1.50) (1.28) (1.27) (1.28) (1.34) (2.04) 
Coca Cultivation (log) -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Taxes (p.c.) 1.12** 0.61# 0.41 0.84* 0.77* 0.49 0.43 0.56 0.29 
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 (0.38) (0.37) (0.38) (0.38) (0.39) (0.37) (0.37) (0.38) (0.40) 
Infant Mortality Rate -0.01# -0.01** -0.01** -0.01* -0.00 -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ELN in community -0.07* -0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
FARC in community -0.02 -0.04# -0.06* 0.01 -0.06* -0.04 -0.05* -0.05* -0.03 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
AUC in community -0.49*** -0.15*** -0.02 -0.38*** -0.18*** -0.10*** -0.03 -0.12** -0.06 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
          
R-squared -0.233 0.032 0.024 -0.265 0.056 0.056 0.050 0.076 0.058 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, # p<0.1; Coefficients in bold are instrumented; Number of observations: 12,057; 
Number of municipalities: 1,098. Municipal and Year fixed effects 
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Table	A6.2:	Ex-Combatants	and	Municipal	Robbery	Rates,	2003	–	2013,	IV/2SLS	Models	Statistics		 Model	7.1	 Model	7.2	 Model	7.3	 Model	7.4	 Model	7.5	 Model	7.6	 Model	7.7	 Model	7.8	 Model	7.9	Instrumented	 Ex-Combatants,	all	 Ex-Combatants,	in	 Ex-Combatants,	out	 Ex-AUC,	all	 Ex-	Guerrilla,	all	 Ex-AUC,	in	 Ex-AUC,	out	 Ex-Guerrilla,	in	 Ex-	Guerrilla,	out	Excluded	Instrument	 Birthplace	All	 Birthplace	All	 Birthplace	All	 Birthplace	AUC		 Birthplace	Guerrilla	 Birthplace	AUC	 Birthplace	AUC	 Birthplace	Guerrilla	 Birthplace	Guerrilla	First	stage	coefficient	instrument	 0.085***	(0.009)	 0.125***	(0.006)	 -0.085***	(0.005)	 0.080***	(0.011)	 0.093***	(0.010)	 0.125***		(0.007)	 -0.080***	(0.006)	 0.104***	(0.009)	 -0.028***	(0.005)	Relevance	Sanderson-Windmeijer	F-test	excluded	instrument	
81.19		(p	=	0.000)	 389.66		(p	=	0.000)	 243.23	(p	=	0.000)	 54.19	(p	=	0.000)	 84.21		(p	=	0.000)	 347.77		(p	=	0.000)	 195.68	(p	=	0.000)	 119.78		(p	=	0.000)	 30.47		(p	=	0.000)	Degrees	of	Freedom	 10940	 10939	 10939	 10939	 10939	 10937	 10937	 10937	 10937	Underidentification	Kleibergen-Paap	rk	LM	statistic,	Chi2(1)	 71.39	(p	=	0.000)	 296.38		(p	=	0.000)	 223.15	(p	=	0.000)	 45.02	(p	=	0.000)		 97.76	(p	=	0.000)	 251.39		(p	=	0.000)	 192.16	(p	=	0.000)	 111.24	(p	=	0.000)	 29.97		(p	=	0.000)	Weak	Instrument	Kleibergen-Paap	rk	Wald	F	statistic	 81.19		 389.66	 243.23	 54.19	 84.21		 347.77			 195.68	 119.78	 30.47			Notes:	All	instrumented	variables	as	well	as	instruments	are	logged.			
  
 1	See,	for	example,	Berhal and Suhrke 2012; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Deglow 
2016; Dercon and Ayalew 1998; Kaplan and Nussio 2018a; 2018b; Marti Puig 2002; 
Rivera 2016; and Schuld 2013.	
2 Colombia had implemented an individual demobilization policy since 1984, but it 
became part of its counterinsurgency strategy from 2002. Kaplan and Nussio (2018a, 
12) argue that its main objective was to weaken rebel groups by obtaining war 
material and strategic information, “the guerrilla fighters have often been lured away 
from their groups with the promise of reintegration benefits”. 
3 The quality of the instruments is discussed further below. Importantly, since the 
models include fixed effects, the dependent variable in effect measures changes in 
crime rate. Whereas it is plausible that recruitment of combatants takes place in 
municipalities with persistent high crime rates, it is much less plausible that changes 
in crime rates affected the number of former combatants born in a particular 
municipality. 
4 A number of further studies analyze specific regions in Colombia: Palou (2009) and 
Betancourt (2010) study Medellin, Nussio and Howe (2014) Cordoba, and Krakowski 
(2015) the Colombian Pacific Coast region. Restrepo and Muggah (2008) analyze 
paramilitary violence across (sub)regions, while our study like Howe (2012) 
encompasses all municipalities in Colombia.  
5 The panel is unbalanced because new municipalities were created over time. Also, 
the Amelia II program has been applied to deal with missing data for specific 




7	The Colombian Agency for Reintegration (ACR) also reports crimes committed by 
ex-combatants for the relevant period. Following the Colombian penal code, these 
reported crimes are grouped into two categories: 9,254 reports (54.43%) are 
categorized as public crimes or crimes against the state, and 7,743 reports (45.55%) 
are private crimes or crimes against persons.	
8	Thanks to one of the reviewers for pointing this out to us.	
9 In the Appendix, Table A2 provides the pairwise correlations between the different 
measures of former combatants and control variables. The high correlation raises 
concerns about multicollinearity when they are included simultaneously. However, 
there are no other indications, such as inflated coefficients and standard errors, 
suggesting reasons for concern. VIF statistics are not useful for fixed-effects panel 
models. Appendix B provides alternative models that circumvent multicollinearity. 
The presented findings are robust.  
10 Appendix A provides detailed definitions of the controls variables, their sources as 
well as descriptive statistics. 
11	The	demobilization surveys of the Agencia Colobiana para la Reintegración (ACR 
are the original source of information (Sistema de Informacion para la Reintegracion 
(SIR)).		
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	12	Considering the total number of ex-combatants (and limiting to those instances 
where there were already some ex-combatants in the municipality), about 10% of the 
observations witnessed at least a doubling of the number of ex-combatants, while 
25% witnessed an growth of at least 10%.	
13 These findings are, however, in line with the expectation that lower quality of 
governance leads to underreporting of crime (see also footnote 6). 
